The Open Court. by unknown
The Open Court.
A ^'SfEEKLY JOUENikL
DEVOTED TO THE RELIGION OF SCIENCE.
No. 328. (Vol. VII.—49 CHICAGO, DECEMBER 7, 1893. J Two Dollars per Year.
I Single Copies, 5 Cents.
Copyright by The Open Court Publishing Co,—Reprints are permitted only on condition of giving full credit to Author and Publisher.
THE DECLINE OF THE SENATE.
EV M. M. TRUMBULL.
In the Fonnn for November, 1893, are two articles
by Prof. H. Yon Hoist, under the attractive titles,
"Shall the Senate Rule the Republic?" and "The Sen-
ate in the Light of History." The essays will com-
mand attention, because Professor Von Hoist has
achieved a national reputation in this country as the
author of a "Constitutional and Political History of
the United States" and a "Life of John C. Calhoun."
He is also Professor of History at the University of
Chicago. These credentials entitle him and his opin-
ions to respectful consideration, and those who admire
the severe castigation of others will be satisfied with
the highly seasoned scolding that Professor Von Hoist
administers to the Senators of the United States. The
article is caustic, and in language hard as nails.
Professor Von Hoist evidently felt an ardent, and,
in his own opinion, a patriotic interest in the repeal of
the silver-purchasing clause of the Sherman Law, and
he became angry and impatient because of the ob-
stacles thrown in the way of that repeal by a small
minority of the Senate. In that choleric temper, and
while the repeal bill was yet pending, he wrote with
excusable indignation, and asked the alarming ques-
tion, "Shall the Senate Rule the Republic?"
When a man feels deeply concerning a political
measure he is apt to write about it like a partisan, and
if he writes in anger he is liable to be illogical, and
perhaps miss the radical cause of the evil he condemns.
In the present case. Professor Von Hoist empties the
vials of his wrath upon the senators, whereas the dan-
gerous power that alarms him lies deeper down ; the
root of it is in the political constitution of the Senate.
It was intended from the beginning that the minority
should "rule the republic" through a legislative right
to defeat the will of the majority ; and this right was
conferred by the Constitution on the Senate. No bill
can become a law except by permission of the Sen-
ate ; no law can be repealed without that permission,
and a majority in the Senate can at any time be formed
by a combination of members representing but a small
fraction of the population, wealth, industry, and busi-
ness of the country.
At the present moment one-fifth of the people have
a majority in the Senate.
Not by the scolding of senators can the tyranny of
the minority be overthrown. If Professor Von Hoist
had a tongue sharp enough to cut glass, it would accom-
plish nothing, unless the keen edge of it were applied
to the Senate as a constitutional aristocracy, instead of
to the Senators as men. The Senate must be deprived
of its lordly prerogatives and be made a representative
assembly. That way lies reform.
Like many other statesmen who spiritualise the
Constitution when the letter of it is against them, Pro-
fessor Von Hoist finds in that instrument "an under-
lying principle" that subverts its meaning and contra-
dicts its words. He says the Senate "outrageously
tramples under foot the underlying principle of the
whole Constitution, if it perverts the right given by
Article I, Section 5, Clause 2, to each House of Con-
gress to 'determine the rules of its proceedings' into
a privilege enabling every one of its members to pre-
vent for an indefinite time its acting." Determining
under that clause of the Constitution "the rules of its
proceedings," the Senate rejected the so-called "gag-
law," the time-saving expedient known as "the pre-
vious question," and allowed each of its members, not
for "an indefinite time," but only for the present, such
freedom of speech as he might wish to exercise, re-
serving to itself the right to change the rules whenever
that freedom was perverted beyond the patience of the
Senate. It is a striking comparison that when Mr.
Reed, and the majority in that branch of Congress
over which he presided, exercised the constitutional
power to "determine the rules " and limit liberty of
speech in order to defeat the dilatory tactics of the
minority, he was called a "Czar," and the House of
Representatives was vehemently accused of "out-
rageously trampling under foot the underlying princi-
ples of the whole Constitution." And, now, when the
Senate pursues the opposite course and allows its mem-
bers liberty, it is accused by Professor Von Hoist of also
trampling on those mystical "underlying principles."
Referring to the rules of the Senate that permit so
much liberty of speech and action to each individual
member. Professor Von Hoist carelessly says : "The
assertion that this has been done in a measure which
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no European legislative body would have allowed is
undoubtedly true." Now, that is not "undoubtedly
true "; the House of Lords is a " European legislative
body," and the House of Lords gives to each individ-
ual member the same freedom of speech and the same
privilege of obstruction that are permitted by the
American Senate. How the House of Lords would
act in case the minority or a faction of that minority
should block'the wheels of legislation for many days,
we do not know, but we do know that the House of
Lords would hesitate long and anxiously before it
would adopt the closure or any similar policy. It
would very likely adopt the plan of the Senate, and
protect itself at last by telling the filibusters that if
they persisted in delaying the public business they
would be compelled to come to order by an alteration
of the rules. When the Senate, in real earnest, re-
solved upon that course of action, the filibustering
stopped.
Professor Von Hoist complains that '-the legisla-
ture of Nevada, with a population barely sufficient for
a good-sized third-class city, has the constitutional
power to delegate to two men the infrangible right of
condemning the seventy millions of the United States
to be a stagnant pool in regard to vital questions."
The metaphor is not quite clear, but through it we may
perceive that Professor Von Hoist complains, not that
Nevada has any senators at all, but merely of their
behavior. This is a trivial matter in a debate involv-
ing the whole character of the Senate, its attributes
and powers. The supreme injustice lies in the Con-
stitution itself, which allows a population barely suffi-
cient for a third-class town to have two senators, and
will not allow New York, with six millions of inhabi-
tants, to have any more than two. This is a solecism
in American politics, and it cannot be perpetual. The
Constitution must eventually be amended, and such in-
equality become impossible. The ludicrous character
of the anomaly appears when the two senators from
Nevada "pair off " with the two senators from New
York. Forty thousand people ' ' pairing " on a political
question with six millions is a comedy. It is true that
the two senators from Nevada have the power to delay
the public business by talking against time, by motions
to adjourn, and all sorts of dilatory tactics, but this is
not an "infrangible right"; it may be broken at any
time by an alteration of the rules. And in the late
contest over the Silver Bill, the " courtesy of the Sen-
ate," in allowing to its members liberty of speech un-
til the abuse of the privilege became intolerable, in-
creased, rather than diminished, the dignity of the
Senate.
Speaking of " The Senate in the Light of History,"
Professor Von Hoist endeavors to show that the moths
have been eating it for more than forty years, and that
it has been perishing of " dry rot " ever since 1849,
which in his opinion was the exact period when the
Senate was in the meridian glory of its "ability and
dignity." He says: "That the Senate has greatly
deteriorated is a commonpla<;e remark—a matter of
universal knowledge—but how greatly it has deterio-
rated can be shown in no other way so forcibly as by
a comparison of its members in 1849 and its members
in 1893." He then "calls the roll" of the Senate of
1849, and selects from "this wonderful body of men "
twenty-one as the most eminent exponents of its "abil-
ity and dignity." Awkwardly enough, among this im-
mortal twenty-one is Henry S. Foote, who contributed
so much to the ability and dignity of the Senate, by
drawing a pistol on a brother senator and attempting
to shoot him in the Senate chamber for " words spoken
in debate." Since 1849 the Senate "has greatly de-
teriorated," so that revolvers as weapons of debate
have become obsolete. We all know that " the- good
old times" is a sentimental myth, and yet we love to
hear their praises chanted in the good, old, grand-
motherly way. A glamour of romantic interest sparkles
about the old Forty-niners of California, and why should
it not irradiate the old Forty-niners of the Senate. It
is kindly in young men to pay this tribute of affection
to a generation gone ; and an old man always takes a
little of the flattery to himself when he hears his little
grandson explain to him in a recitation from the Lays
of Macaulay, how well Horatius kept the bridge "in
the brave days of old."
In order to show how greatly the Senate has deterio-
rated, Prof. Von Hoist classifies the senators by name,
and separates them into five groups as if they were
ethnic specimens in the museum of the Chicago Uni-
versity, and with critical discrimination labels them in
the following order : " (i) Senators of the old type who
most nearly represent the true theory and traditions
of the Senate. (2) Senators who are professional poli-
ticians, and owe their elevation to political manipula-
tion. (3) Senators who have reached their present
eminence, mainl}', if not entirely, by reason of their
wealth. (4) Accidental senators and oddities. (5) Old
fogy senators."
It will readily appear to men at all familiar with
American politics and politicians that the above classi-
fication is partial and unfair. Some of the models in
cabinet No. i might very properly be put in either of
the other groups, while some of the specimens in cab-
inets 4 and 5 might very justly be transferred to cab-
inet No. I. The danger of making those mistakes ought
to have prevented the classification of the senators by
name in the pages of a public magazine, and indeed it
appears that Professor Von Hoist himself had misgiv-
ings ; for he shifts the responsibility from himself to
the shoulders of six anonymous men " of most excellent
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judgment, some of whom are Democrats and some Re-
publicans, some of whom have a personal acquaintance
with most of the senators and have opportunity to know
them close at hand." These six men were the com-
mittee appointed b}' Professor \"on Hoist to make the
classification. Before his explanation can be accepted.
Professor \'on Hoist ought to name his authorities.
The men who make such statements ought to be brave
enough to let themselves be known, for it fs not chival-
rous to break in secret safet\' the laws of "personal
acquaintance" and label and libel friends.
As will presently be seen, Professor Yon Hoist's
mysterious cabinet council betrayed him into a very
illogical and embarrassing position, for in the persons
of the classified senators the " six men of most excel-
lent judgment " contradict the praises that Professor
Von Hoist bestows upon the Senate of 1867. In ad-
miration of that assembly he says, "The Senate real-
ised its old ideal as a check on popular folly when it
blocked the outrageous attempt to impeach Andrew
Johnson, and thus to establish a precedent which would
put the executive at the mercy of the legislative branch.
In every great crisis since that time it has failed."
The statement is altogether incorrect. Professor
\'on Hoist cannot be ignorant of the difference be-
tween impeachment and conviction, yet he carelessl3'
confounds those terms as if the)' meant the same
thing. An impeachment is nothing but an accusa-
tion ; more dignified and stately than an indictment
which applies to ordinary criminals, but it is onl}' an
indictment after all. Impeachment is the prerogative
of the House of Representatives, but conviction must
be by the Senate. Andrew Johnson rcas impeached
by the House of Representatives, and "the Senate
that realised its old ideal " actually declared him guilt)'
by a majority of thirty-five to eighteen. Not onh' was
the impeachment not "blocked" by the Senate but
that body approved it and thereby vindicated the House
of Representatives. The prosecution failed because
the vote for conviction was one less than the two-thirds
majority required by the Constitution ; and so Andrew
Johnson escaped punishment for attempting to recon-
struct the southern states in defiance of the will of
Congress; an "outrageous" attempt to put the legis-
lative at the mercy of the executive branch.
Not being very familiar with the history of the
statesmen of his time, Professor \"on Hoist allowed
himself to be led into an awkward predicament by his
invisible "six men," for while he was denouncing the
Senate for certain acts of wickedness, they were put-
ting the verj' delinquents who did the mischief into
class No. I, composed of " Senators of the old tj'pe who
most nearly represent the true theorj' and traditions of
the Senate." It is a comical complication but Pro-
fessor \'on Hoist must blame the "six men " for it, that
among the senators in class No. i are some who were in
the Senate in 1S67, and actually voted Andrew Johnson
guiltv, while others in that same class were members of
the House of Representatives then and voted enthusi-
asticalh' for that "outrageous" impeachment ; and one
of them. i\Ir. Wilson of Iowa, was a member of the im-
peachment committee appointed by the House to pros-
ecute the President.
Professor \'on Hoist gives a catalogue of legisla-
tive acts that mark the degradation and deca}' of the
Senate, and yet nearlj' all the senators put b)' the
secret council into cabinet No. i voted for those rep-
rehensible bills. Professor \'on Hoist says that "for
twenty 3'ears the Senate has been steadily, and of late
rapidly degenerating, " and it is .very awkward for him
that the men whose votes have caused this degeneracy
are classified by his committee of six among the " Sen-
ators of the old theory and traditions of the Senate."
It is a melancholy thought that even including the men
who voted for those bad bills only nineteen senators
were worthy to be classed as No. i, while thirty-six
were left out of any classification whatever, because
they are "Senators who seem to belong to no logical
category—simply commonplace men of no decided
characteristics." Among these, of course, are Voor-
hees. Vest, Hale, Mitchell of Oregon, and others, who
certainl)' deserve to be classified somewhere.
Some persons will agree, and others will disagree,
with Professor \'on Hoist, in the opinion that the ex-
isting Senate is "a commonplace body in comparison
with the Senate of any preceding time." He tempers
the verdict with a recommendation to mercy, saying :
" Due allowance, of course, must be made for misjudg-
ment in every comparison of a contemporaneous body
with a body in the past, whose real greatness maj' have
been magnified by its distance from us." He agrees
that "allowance must be made," but he does not make
it: for if he did, he would hardly place among the
great senators of 1849, Henry S. Foote, W. P. Man-
gum, Arthur P. Butler, J. M. Berrien, and David L.
Yulec. Surel}', it is nothing but the kindly magic of
time and distance that can make these men great.
While the number of great men in ever}' legislature
varies according to the opportunities of their era,
there never was a Senate that was not composed in
the main of commonplace men, with a sprinkling of
orators and statesmen thrown in to give it character ;
giants in those days, mighty men which were of old,
men of renown, like Cicero, Mirabeau, Chatham, Burke,
and \^"ebster. The critics of the next generation will
be contrasting their own degenerate senators with the
"Old Romans" who adorned the Senate in 1893.
Professor Von Hoist censures the senators for the
manner in which they exercise the power given to
them by the Constitution, but he approves the power
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itself that enables the minority to rule, and he con-
cludes his article by sa}ing : "The organisation of the
Senate, and even the method of the election of sena-
tors, vindicate the wisdom of the fathers ; its present
personnel simply marks the decline of politics as one of
the noble professions." He thinks it wise that Nevada
should have as many senators as New York, and then
censures the thistle for not bearing figs.
IS REINCARNATION A NATURAL LAW ?
BY THOMAS WILLIAMS.
No QUESTION is of more interest or of greater im-
portance than that relating to the origin and future of
a human soul. Is it as Christianity maintains, brought
into existence by human agency and the grace of God,
or is there any truth in that archaic belief in reincar-
nation which gives to every man and woman a past
directly connected with the progress of the human
race? The side lights which this latter theory throws
upon the causes of good and evil which aftect us dur-
ing life and the connexion which it shows between
physical evolution and the human soul are certainly
very strong inducements to believe that it is the true
and proper theory for a human life, but in these da3's
theory which cannot find its explanation in modern
science is not likely to take a permanent hold on mod-
ern thought, and however reasonable reincarnation
may appear to the few who have gone deeply into the
question, it is requisite that a basis should be shown to
exist in natural law to induce the many to take the
necessary steps which lead to a clear comprehension
of its truth.
Let me briefly explain the theory of the re-birth.
By it ever}' human soul passes successively through
many lives upon this earth in order to evolve the latent
possibilities of its own perfection. Man, instead of,
as is generally supposed, dropping into the line of
physical evolution for a score or so of years and then
vanishing for ever from the progress of events with
which he has so accidently become associated, has an
individual progress of his own upon the spiritual plane
of being, which like a human thread knits together
successive eras of personal evolution. These countless
lines of individual progress stretching from the earliest
periods of earth- life into the future of our race weave
themselves into a continuous background of causation
for that physical development which we have learnt to
recognise as the method of natural evolution, for by
this theory physical life with all its visible effects is
the result of an invisible and spiritual activity. In
fact the reign of natural law is the objective expression
of subjective and spiritual causes of which man in the
abstract is the chief agent. It is not my intention here
to defend this theor}' but to endeavor to show how
modern research into the atomic and molecular struc-
ture of the human frame has reached to the knowledge
of certain simple facts which prove, first, that man is
possessed of an immaterial ego ; second, that this ego
must be re-born upon this planet.
Let me define the ego in such a way that it may be
recognised at once as an indisputable fact. It is that
consciousness of individual identity which we all pos-
sess and which is distinct from our recognition of our-
selves as a particular person. '-' I am," and this knowl-
edge requires no expansion as to the nature of this /,
whether complex or simple, shaped or shapeless, male
or female, to convince us of its absolute realit}?.
This is what is meant b}' the ego of a human being.
As an intangible perception of the mind this ego ap-
pears at first sight to afford but a slender basis on
which to found a proof of the nature of the connexion
between earth-life and the human soul, yet when we
examine into its relation to the body it informs, we
shall, I think, so clearly discern its presence and its
distinctive qualit}' as to realise it as a reasonable ne-
cessity, a thing beyond dispute.
Whence comes this sense of individual identity?
Does it proceed from any particular grouping of the
brain cells? Since there is not a single molecule or
atom in the whole mass of cerebral substance which
does not submit to constant change, our sense of per-
manent identity does not proceed from this. But if the
grouping of atoms and molecules does not produce it,
is it not perhaps an innate attribute of matter? To
this question science answers that during an average
life not only the particles of the brain but of the entire
body are changed completel}' several times. Therefore
if our identity persists throughout this period of change
it cannot belong to matter.
Therefore, as neither matter nor the grouping of
the cells possess identity, this latter must proceed from
something which is distinctly separate from the phys-
ical man ; and since an individual's identity is one and
the same for all his life we must believe first that it is
an immaterial unit or ego, then that its relation to the
body through which it manifests is that of permanence
to hiipermanence.
This distinction, arrived at as the result of scientific
investigation, places us at once upon firm ground. We
see that our individuality or permanent identity is fixed
by its contrast to our personality' or visible form whose
particles are ever on the change, and this distinction
is fatal to any attempt which maybe made to deny the
separateness of the consciousness of the ego from the
consciousness of the body. For, while my personal
consciousness is always changing in Answer to the
variations of atoms and molecules of which I am made,
the individual consciousness of selfhood remains ever
the same.
This separation between these two sources of con-
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sciousness is still more apparent if we look at the
method by which self-consciousness is produced. Ever}'
action of bod}' or mind is accompanied b}' a conscious-
ness that "/am acting," "/am thinking," and this
self-perception is the result of a corresponding modifi-
cation in physical substance, so that the invisible per-
manenc}- of identity makes itself felt by destroying the
identit)' of matter througli which it manifests. Thus,
while the change produced amongst the particles of
ni}' bod}' takes the form of some mental perception or
physical sensation, each is always accompanied by that
other sense of changeless identit}- which comes from the
immaterial (spiritual) ego.
Here, then, we have established the duality of man
consisting of a physical being with a physical con-
sciousness manifesting by the means of change and the
immaterial ego whose whole existence depends upon
the exact opposite of the other, a changeless perma-
nency throughout a life. The question which we have
to solve is whether science can afford a proof that it
must be subject to re-birth upon this earth. Let us
seek for a solution in the law of heredity. Controversy
is still active as to how far environment affects the off-
spring of a human being and how far natural selection
is responsible for those initial peculiarities which form
the basis of a human character, but even if we take
heredity in its most limited senses as defined by Galton
and by Weismann we shall, I think, have sufficient left
to prove that re-birth is necessary to the human ego.
A man's character may be said to be the represen-
tation of his mental and physical condition, and both
these states are expressed objectively by activities pro-
ductive of corresponding changes in material or in the
grouping of atoms and molecules in the brain or bod}'.
But every one of these changes is accompanied by an
emission of self-consciousness which is inseparable
from them, and it becomes therefore a question as to
whether physiological derangement is the cause of this
self-consciousness or whether the latter is the cause
of the former. We know that self-consciousness is the
result of the ego identifying itself with every one of
these simple or complex modifications in the physical
substance of the human body. We also know that this
act of identification leaves the identity of the ego un-
altered while it gives to the atoms and molecules which
are manifesting it an identity which does not really be-
long to them. In fact the effect of identification is only
operative on the substance identified and not on the
ego, and therefore the ego must be the cause of these
modifications and changes in the physical man. ' It
follows from this that every sensation and thought is
caused by the ego bringing to bear upon the atoms and
molecules of brain and body its power of identification
in order to manifest self-consciousness in the physical
man. In this wav it becomes the direct cause of the
manifestation of personal character and our problem
narrows itself down to this : is there an}' portion of a
personal character which we know to be a permanent
basis for the rest? Undoubtedly the law of heredity
offers such a basis and tlierefore we have established
the fact that personal characteristics are partly per-
manent and partly subject to change, and since we have
seen that matter is incapable of furnishing anything in
the shape of permanent identity it becomes evident
that it comes direct from the ego, while the former is
found in the ph\sical man as an external and mutable
consciousness evoked out of matter by the power of an
inner and changeless egoity. Thus the basis of char-
acter exhibited by the law of heredity lies in the soul,
while those characteristics which are derived from en-
vironment and are identified with the ego belong to
the ever changing and physical personality. But if
heredity is the expression of egoity it implies that the
ego must have evolved, and since its evolution takes
the form of heredity it niust have evolved upon this
earth. Therefore birth is a re-birth and the evolution
of physical man is based on the permanent character-
istics acquired by the evolving soul. The whole proof
of reincarnation from this point of view lies in the fact
that heredity comes from the ego itself and not from
the physical man, and is based on the impossibility
which the atoms and molecules of physical substance
lie under of furnishing anything like a permanent and
unbroken identity. But in this we are brought face to
face with what seems a contradiction ; for if the soul
evolves what becomes of its characteristic of immutable
permanency ? But on closer analysis this objection is
found to be siiperficial. That which distinguishes one
human being from another is force of character ; some-
times it is feeble so as to cause him or her to be put
down as colorless and lacking in individuality ; some-
times it is so prominent that the possessor becomes
marked off and separated from tils' crowd : and be-
tween these two extremes it exists in countless grada-
tions of power appropriate to the diversity of character
exhibited by different persons. Now force of character
represents a greater or less degree of individuality and
it is active in us as a more or less vivid perception of
self as unfolded in our self-consciousness. It is there-
fore dependent on the sensitiveness which the outer
consciousness of the physical man possesses to answer
to the power of identification exercised on the atoms
and molecules of the body by the ego within. But this
increase in identity does not change it ; and if, as we
have seen, the degree of force of character possessed
by the ego is manifested in physical man as definite
hereditary characteristics, this simply means that cer-
tain permanent peculiarities accompany the exercise
of definite degrees of individuality. So that the evo-
lution of a human soul is found to consist in its ob-
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taining a stronger or weaker capacity for individualisa-
tion in matter and according to its acquired individ-
ualit}', so will certain well-defined and appropriate
characteristics accompany every manifestation of self-
consciousness which appears in the physical man.
THE EGO AS IDENTITY OF SELF.
Mr. Thomas Williams asks, "Is reincarnation a
natural law? " and answers the question in the affirma-
tive. Like him, we also believe that reincarnation takes
place, and that it takes place according to natural law.
In fact, heredity is reincarnation, for heredity is a
transference not only of bodily, but also of spiritual,
peculiarities ; it is a preservation of psychical not less
than of physical qualities ; it is a continuance of soul-
forms.
We may add, incidentally, that the human soul is
preserved, not only by heredity, but also by education.
Heredity, however, is and will always remain the broad
basis of any and all soul-transference, for heredity
transmits the dispositions without which any amount
of instruction would be as hopeless as the attempt to
teach a monkey writing and reading.
Reincarnation, being the reappearance of souls in
the bodies of new generations, must, together with
heredity, be taken as a fact. Not the fact, but its in-
terpretation, can be subject to doubt.
The main objection to the term "reincarnation"
lies in its having been too frequently used in the ser-
vice of dualistic conceptions of the soul. When a
man died, his soul was supposed to leave his body, to
hover about in the air, or in some unknown region,
and then to re-enter another body, from which it could
again be separated only by death. These fantastic
notions must, of course, be dropped, and we need
not even take the trouble to refute them in the shape
in which they were and are still held by the people of
India, who take the mythology of their religion for
literal truth.
There is perhaps no one among us who would ac-
cept the idea of a migration of souls, such as the an-
cient Hindus believed in. Nevertheless, that soul-
conception upon which this view is based has still
many advocates, and may even be regarded as the
most popular one among the people, in the churches,
and also at our universities. The soul is still regarded
as an entity which has an independent existence, and
which, after leaving the body on death, will, like a
material thing, remain for a while in a particular place.
This soul- entity is supposed to produce the continuity
and unity of our psychical life. The notion of a sepa-
rate ego-entity is based upon that consciousness of
identity which refers all the feelings we experience, the
thoughts we have, and the acts we perform to one and
the same being, called by every one speaking of him-
self, "/. " This hypothetical being, supposed to be at
the bottom of all psychical acts as their agent or prim i/iii
morcns, may be briefly called the ego-soul.
We sa}^ that the belief in an ego-soul is the basis
of the old Hindu mythology of metempsychosis or
soul-migration ; indeed, there is no material difference
between the one and the other view ; and we add that
it must be rejected as a wrong interpretation of the
facts of reincarnation.
Mr. Thomas Williams presents with great lucidity
and vigor in his article the reason which to me has
always appeared as the strongest argument in favor of
an ego-soul. The argument is not new; it is as old as
our scientific materialism. When Baron d'HoIbach
came out with his famous work, " Le systeme de la na-
ture," in which he analysed man and declared that his
whole being consisted merely of material particles in
motion, he and men of his kin received the answer that
the soul continued even after the changes of the body's
material particles and must therefore be regarded as
something different from matter in motion.
J. P. Hebel, the famous calendar-writer, who as
such, and in his style, but not in his conception of life,
greatly resembles Benjamin Franklin, summed up the
whole case in a brief little article, entitled "An Argu-
ment in Favor of the Immateriality of the Soul."*
'
' The physicists have demonstrated that the body of man is in
a constant state of transformation ; that in the course of a few
years it is a totally changed and new body in all its parts. That is
to say, after a lapse of ten years we possess, so far as component
elements are concerned, different nerves, and, of course, different
nervous fluids, and yet the same old soul. The soul, consequently,
cannot consist of matter.
"My body has, then, in this point of view, wholly changed at
least three times in my life, and I have not noticed the change in
the least ; I have always had the same consciousness, and feel that
I still continue the same individual. Now, what is that part of my
being that feels and knows this? What fi.xed point of my unchange-
able existence is it in me by means of which I, despite all the trit-
urations and evaporations of my material parts, am still always
the same? Must it not be something unchangeable, and, thus,
something immaterial ?
'
' That the scarred wound on the arm that I now have still
pains me as it pained on the day on which it was made and healed,
is intelligible. The scar itself informs me that the parts here are
arranged in a defective and unnatural manner ; that the normal
organic action of nature cannot return until the scar is gone. So,
too, new parts arrange themselves defectively, and as long as this
goes on I must continue to feel new pain. Not the wound that I
received twenty years ago, nor the scar that formed in its place
now pains me, but the scar that I now have, for the very same
reason that the original one pained me. This is intelligible enough.
"But, that I can recognise a sermon, a poem, or apiece of
music that I hear with the ear I now have, as the same that I
learned by heart fifteen years ago, or listened to at that time with
special sympathy and pleasure ; or that these fingers can now play
a piece upon the piano which I have perhaps not thought of in an
equal number of years—such a feat would be unintelligible if there
* Hebel was a contemporary of Napoleon I. The article quoted is found
in Hebel's IVerke, II, p. 310, Berlin, G. Grote.
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were not something in me that had not suffered since that time a
change of its parts, and is therefore immaterial."
Rebel's argument proves indeed tliat the soul is
immaterial, but it does not prove the existence of an
ego-soul. Rebel claims that there is a difference be-
tween the scar and the memory-trace of a melody or
a word. The memory of the pain of the wound, which
continues to be felt in the scar, is comprehensible, but
the memor)' of such brain-impressions as are left by
words is, as he claims, incomprehensible. Is this con-
sistent? Is not the continuity of the one as easily un-
derstood as that of the other; and if the pain of the
wound, as a peculiar kind of feeling, is preserved in
the scar as a peculiar misformation of the tissues, wh\-
should not in the brain, also, the form of a feeling be
preserved with the form of its cerebral structures? The
material particles of our body change, but the form is
preserved ; and the form of an organism is that which
constitutes its soul.
It is apparent that the assumption of an identit_\'-
preserving soul-centre is gratuitous and redundant.
There is in every organism a continuit}' of form. In
the constant flu.x; of matter through our bodj- the traces
of impressions are preserved ; and the organism thus
acquires the disposition to reproduce the feelings of
former sense-impressions, whenever their forms are re-
vived by some agitation.
Souls are the forms of feelings, of thoughts, of im-
pulses, of aspirations. The feelings which 1 have are
at the same time brain-motions ; the former are the
subjectivity, the latter the objectivity of mj' existence.
No subjectivitv is. according to the monistic world-
view, thinkable without its objectivit}- ; and vii-t- vcTsa,
everj' objectivity is conceived of as having a subjectivity
corresponding" to its form.
This view seems to do away with the soul, but it
only does away with the hypothesis of soul-substan-
tialit}' and of the ego-soul. The facts of soul-life re-
main ; that interpretation only which assumed the ex-
istence of a hypothetical soul-entity or identitj'-creat-
ing centre has been abandoned. We might as well
assume an identit3'-creating substance for the fountain
which remains the same by preserving its form in the
constant flux of its waters. He who denies that there
is in the fountain such an identity-creating thing which
would exist even if there were no water, a kind of foun-
tain-in-itself, does not as yet deny the existence of the
fountain. There are no fountains-in-themselves, nor
are there souls-in-themselves ; yet there are souls and
there are fountains, and the form of a fountain can be
renewed as well as souls are reincarnated in coming
generations.
Truly, there is a migration of soul. It is a transfer,
not of m}'sterious soul-monads or ego-entities, but of
soul-forms : it is not material, but spiritual. Wherever
you impress }'our ideas and aspirations, there you in-
sert your soul. You make jour own being migrate,
and it will continue to exist and to live and to grow.
The continuity of our personality during our own life,
and also the immortalit}' of our souls, are brought
about by the preservation and transfer of soul-forms.
We have to learn that forms are not nonentities
;
they are the most important realities in the world.
To say that souls are forms does not mean that souls
do not exist, but onh' that they are immaterial.
It is quite difficult to understand that something
may be unmaterial and yei real. Therefore all the
teachers of mankind who for ethical purposes have had
to instruct people concerning the nature of the soul, ( for
ethics is mainl}' a dietetics of the soul, ) have resorted to
parables, in which the soul is represented as an en-
tit}'. The parable is a vehicle for convej'ing a truth to
those who are not as }'et able to grasp it. The imma-
ture can feel the truth in a parable and ma}' be bene-
fited by it as though they had understood it.
Those who have abandoned the errors of the sub-
stantiality of the soul, of the ego-entity, and similar
conceptions, should know and bear in mind that the
reality of the soul remains the same as before. The
preservation of soul-forms, called memor)' ; the con-
tinuit}' of life, which is the basis of personalit}' ; the
immortality of psychical being ; and the reincarnation
of souls—are actualities. They may lose in the light of
science the glamor of mysteriousness, but at the same
time they will gain in importance, grandeur, and dig-
nit\' the better they are known. p. c.
CHAPTERS FROM THE NEW APOCRYPHA.
THE PARABLE OF THE BLIND MAN,
BV HUDOR GENONE.
And Jesus spake again a parable unto them, say-
ing. Behold, there was a certain rich man which had
a vineyard
;
And when the time came for the ripening of the
grapes there were few laborers to be hired.
Then the rich man saith unto his steward, Go }-e
into the market-place and hire men to gather my
grapes
;
And if ye find not them whose business it is to
gather the fruit of the vine for the wine-press, hire
others also, and whoever will come to gather my grapes
forbid him not.
So the steward did as his lord commanded, and
went into the market-place and hired laborers, and
others also ;
And he came with them whom he had hired unto
his lord and saith unto him. The harvest truly is plen-
teous, but the laborers are few.
Yet have I done as thou hast commanded ; I have
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hired others also, the halt, and the aged, and even
this blind man.
And the rich man saith unto his steward, Thou
hast done well ; give therefore to every one a basket,
and send him into m}' vineyard, that he may gather
grapes for the wine-press.
So every one of them that had been hired went forth
unto the vineyard and toiled all the day.
And at nightfall they came and brought the grapes
which they had gathered unto the wine-press.
And of the laborers, some brought an hundred bas-
kets, and some sixty, and some thirt)-.
And when my lord reckoned with them he com-
manded his steward to give unto every man according
to his work.—unto him who gathered an hundyed bas-
kets, ten farthings,—unto him who gathered si.xty
baskets, six farthings, and unto him who gathered
thirty baskets, three farthings.
Then came also the others, the halt and the aged ;
and some had ten baskets, and some five, and some
three.
And my lord commanded his steward to give unto
every man according to his work,—unto him who gath-
ered ten baskets, ten farthings,—unto him who gath-
ered five baskets, -five farthings, and unto him who
gathered three baskets, three farthings.
Then the steward saith unto my lord, Lo ! now will
I do as thou commandest; but on the morrow, when
the laborers come again to gather thy grapes, they will
murmur against thee.
And will say among themselves, what doth it mat-
ter if we be idle? And he that gathered an hundred
baskets will gather ten,—and he that gathered sixty
will gather six, and he that gathered thirty will gather
three.
Then my lord saith unto the steward. Do as I have
commanded thee, for the work of the day shall reckon
for itself.
And again my lord saith imto the steward. Where
is the blind man? And even as he spake, the blind
man, standing afar off, lifted up his voice and saith.
Here am I.
Again he saith, (because he heard tlie voice.) I
come quickly. And when he drew nigh, the steward
saw that he had gathered no grapes
;
And he was angr}', and saith unto the blind man,
Thou wicked and slothfid servant ; thou hast been idle
all the da}' and hast gathered nothing. Go thou away
empty.
Then the blind man lifted up his voice and wept,
and saith. Say not that I have been slothful, but rather
that I have toiled all the day and have gathered noth-
ing. Let it be as my lord commandeth.
Then the lord rebuked the unjust steward, and
saith unto him,
Give unto the blind man ten farthings, and let him
go his wa}', for he hath done what he could.
Verily, I say unto thee, the laborer shall indeed be
judged by the fruit of his labor
;
And the halt and the aged likewise, each according,
to his ability.
For of a truth I require of no man more than he is
able, and of this blind man do I require nothing, for
thou didst hire him to work in my vineyard, knowing
that he was blind.
NOTES.
The Commonwealth Company, New York, 28 Lafayette Place,
has published an English translation, from the third German edi-
tion, of Dr. Arnold Dodel's ' ' Moses or Darwin ; A School Problem
for All Fiiends of Truth and Progress." (Price, $1 00.) The
book consists of a series of free lectures delivered before popular
gatherings at Ziirich and St. Gall, Switzerland, on the subject of
evolution, and is intended to disseminate among the unscientific
public the principles of this doctrine as opposed to those of the
traditional religions. The same company also publishes, (price,
fifty cents,) "A History of Religions," by Elizabeth E. Evans,
which is, as its sub-title informs us, a condensed statement of the
results of scientific research and philosophical criticism. It is a
short and meagre statement (12S pages) of some of the results of
the history of comparative religions and of critical biblical re-
search, which can hardly justify the title of "A History of Reli-
gions," being rather an attempt to show that Christianity is of
natural, not divine, origin, and that it is incompetent to cope with
the problems of modern times.
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